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Abstract: This paper analyzes the way in which the Ame-
rican pragmatist John Dewey’s engaged critically with 
Hermann Lotze’s logic in a series of papers in the 1903 
anthology Studies in Logical Theory. The first part of the 
paper describes the backdrop for Dewey’s critical enga-
gement with Lotze, namely, his attempt to distinguish his 
newly developed instrumentalist understanding of logic 
from the absolute idealism that had played an important 
role in his earlier thinking. The next part of the paper then 
describes the instrumental position from which Dewey 
approached Lotze’s thinking, while the final part of the 
paper examines Dewey’s critical analysis of Lotze’s thin-
king about logic. Here the conclusion will be that even 
though Dewey saw Lotze as “one of the most vigorous 
and acute of modern logicians”, he also thought that Lo-
tze represented “a halting-stage in the evolution of logical 
theory” in so far as his thinking never managed to get be-
yond the classical “empiristic and transcendental logics” 
in the way that Dewey thought his own instrumental logic 
managed to do. 
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Introduction 
 
In the preface to his 1938 magnum opus Logic: The The-
ory of Inquiry, the American pragmatist philosopher John 
Dewey (1859-1952) begins by pointing out that the book 
represents the culmination of “ideas regarding the nature 
of logical theory that were first presented, some forty ye-
ars ago, in Studies in Logical Theory”, and then goes on 
to say that “with the outstanding exception of Peirce, I 
have learned most from writers with whose positions I 
have in the end been compelled to disagree” (pp. iii-iv). 
What Dewey does not mention in the preface, however, is 
that one of the persons from whom he learned so much, 
although in the end had to disagree with, was the German 
philosopher Hermann Lotze (1817-1881). But there can 
be no doubt that Lotze was one of these persons. In each 
of the four essays that Dewey contributed to the 1903 an-
thology Studies in Logical Theory, in which he and some 
of his students at the University of Chicago presented 
their new ‘instrumental’ logic for the first time, Dewey 
thus develops his own position in and through a critical 
analysis of the 1888 English translation of Lotze’s logic. 
Despite the fact that Lotze probably is the single philoso-
pher whose work Dewey has examined the most in exege-
tical detail (if one discounts his early work on Leibniz), 
surprisingly little has been written about the encounter 
between these two thinkers. The fact that Lotze influen-
ced Dewey is just mentioned in William R. Woodward’s 
magisterial biography Hermann Lotze: An Intellectual 
Biography, but not developed in any detail, just as the re-
cent anthology Lotze et son Héritage does not have an es-
say on Dewey and Lotze, even though it does have ones 
on Lotze, James and Santayana. And while a lot of stan-
dard works on Dewey’s thinking about logic point out 
that he engaged with Lotze’s thinking, none of them anal-
yzes this engagement in detail1. Even though James Scott 
Johnston cannot avoid discussing Dewey’s engagement 
with Lotze in his fine John Dewey’s Earlier Logical The-
ory, it is telling that he complains about how Dewey’s 
engagement with Lotze “makes for an unsatisfactory e-
xplication of Dewey’s own logical theory” because it is 
quite “difficult to read Dewey’s positive statements on 
logical theory out of his (negative) criticisms of Lotze”2. 
Given the fact that Johnston is primarily interested in 
showing that Dewey never really left the Hegelianism of 
his youth, it is of course perfectly understandable that he 
is not interested in his engagement with Lotze for its own 
sake. But it just goes to prove that this is a general trend 
among Dewey scholars. In fact, the most detailed exami-
nation of Dewey’s engagement with Lotze seems to be 
Christopher Hookway’s extremely short “Lotze and the 
classical pragmatists” from 2009, which in less than eight 
pages discusses the different ways in which “the philoso-
phical ideas of both James and Dewey were influenced by 
their knowledge of Lotze’s writings”, and even Hookway 
ends by concluding that “this part of the intellectual con-
text of pragmatism probably has more of offer to our un-
derstanding of James and Dewey than is currently suppo-
sed”3. I fully agree with Hookway, and in this essay, ac-
cordingly, I intend to examine in detail Dewey’s critical 
engagement with Lotze’s thinking about logic in Studies 
in Logical Theory. In the first part I sketch the 
background for Dewey’s engagement with Lotze. This 
part will, primarily, consist of a description of the position 
that Studies in Logical Theory occupies in Dewey’s mo-
vement away from the absolutism of his youth towards 
his more mature pragmatism. Then I move on to describe 
the logical position – instrumentalism – from which De-
wey approached Lotze’s thinking. Finally, I then examine 
Dewey’s critical analysis of Lotze’s thinking about logic. 
My conclusion here will be that even though Dewey saw 
Lotze as “one of the most vigorous and acute of modern 
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logicians”, he also thought that Lotze represented “a hal-
ting-stage in the evolution of logical theory” in so far as 
his thinking never managed to get beyond the classical 
“empiristic and transcendental logics” in the way that 
Dewey thought his own instrumental logic managed to 
do4. 
 
 
2. From absolutism to experimentalism: Dewey’s He-
gelian background 
 
While Dewey today is recognized as one the three most 
prominent classical pragmatists – together with William 
James and Charles S. Peirce – he began his career by 
being heavily influenced by German Idealism and espe-
cially by the neo-Hegelianism that held sway when he re-
ceived his philosophical formation in the 1870s and 
1880s. As has been described in detail by James A. Good, 
it was not just the British Isles that were influenced by 
German philosophy and especially by Neo-Hegelianism 
in the latter half of the 19th century. The same was also 
the case with the US, which as a consequence did not just 
send many of its young philosophy students to study in 
Germany, but also witnessed the development of a parti-
cular American form of Hegelianism centered in St. Louis 
(hence the name The St. Louis Hegelians), and it is this 
American Hegelianism which influenced Dewey’s early 
formation as a philosopher5. In a way this influence alre-
ady began before Dewey decided on philosophy as his 
preferred career choice. Before he made that momentous 
decision, Dewey thus sent two articles to, in his own 
words, the “well-known Hegelian” W. T. Harris asking 
for his advice “as to the possibility of [Dewey] succes-
sfully prosecuting philosophical studies”6. Since Harris’ 
answer turned out to be encouraging Dewey began his 
graduate studies in philosophy at the new research 
university Johns Hopkins in 1882, where his first serious 
encounter with German Idealism and Hegelianism took 
place. This encounter was mediated by his new teacher 
George Sylvester Morris, who was described at the time 
as “one of the most accomplished Hegel scholars in Ame-
rica”, and who “deeply affected” Dewey with his “enthu-
siastic and scholarly devotion”7. Besides Morris and his 
particular American version of neo-Hegelianism, howe-
ver, Dewey was also influenced by such British neo-
Hegelians as Thomas Hill Green, Edward and John Caird, 
and William Wallace. As a consequence of this strong 
Hegelian influence, Dewey was led to develop a Hegelian 
critique of Kant, which he submitted as his doctoral thesis 
when he graduated from Johns Hopkins in 1884. 
When he left Johns Hopkins, Dewey had thus been 
deeply affected by neo-Hegelianism and had also come to 
think of himself as part of this movement. In fact, the 
impact that Hegelian ways of thinking made on him du-
ring these formative years was so strong that in 1930, 
when he looked back on his philosophical development in 
the autobiographical essay “From Absolutism to Experi-
mentalism”, he admitted that “the acquaintance with He-
gel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking”8. In the 
same essay, however, he also pointed out that he gra-
dually “drifted away from Hegelianism in the next fifteen 
years” after he left Johns Hopkins. Even though this move 
away from Hegelianism happened gradually, one specific 
event is usually pointed out as being of particular impor-
tance in the process, namely, Dewey’s 1890 encounter 
with William James’ monstrous masterpiece The Princi-
ples of Psychology9. Dewey’s encounter with James’ fa-
mous book took place against the backdrop of his own 
Hegelian inspired treatment of the new, emerging science 
of psychology in his 1886 Psychology, where he still ope-
rated with the idea of an “absolute mind”10.What influen-
ced Dewey most in James’ book was his thoroughly bio-
logical, Darwinian approach to mental life, or, as Dewey 
himself described it, “the objective biological factor in 
James’s conception of thought”11.What Dewey referred to 
by this ‘objective biological factor’ was the fact that Ja-
mes in The Principles treats all categories as tools or me-
ans for life or activity. This new way of thinking made it 
possible for Dewey to see another way in which one 
could avoid the individualism and particularism of empi-
ricism that had attracted him to Hegelianism in the first 
place. Instead of postulating some kind of constitutive 
thought, it now became possible to see life, activity or e-
xperience as the thing that held things together and gave 
them unity. Taking his cue from this Jamesian idea, De-
wey then gradually drifted away from neo-Hegelianism 
and especially the idea of a “transcendent absolute”. One 
aspect of the process had to do with psychology where he 
developed a functionalist-biological approach which re-
ceived its classical expression in his famous 1896 article 
“The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”. Another aspect 
– and the one that is most important in relation to Lotze – 
had to do with logic. This was a subject that Dewey had 
taught both in 1890 and in 1899-1900 through critical di-
scussions of the works of such influential thinkers as John 
Stuart Mill, Bernard Bosanquet, Francis Herbert Bradley 
and - Hermann Lotze. But it was through his critical 
engagement with Lotze’s logic in Studies in Logical The-
ory from 1903 that he first presented his new instrumental 
understanding of logic to a broader audience, which also, 
as it is often said, represented the final, culminating stage 
in his move from Absolutism to Experimentalism. In this 
way Dewey’s critical engagement with Lotze played an 
important role in his move from Absolutism to Experi-
mentalism, and while John R. Shook is probably right to 
point out that Dewey, in theory, might as well have cho-
sen Bradley or Bosanquet as the target of his analysis, he 
also seems right when he suggests that “Lotze’s preemi-
nent stature and the structure of his logical and epistemo-
logical system” probably made him “an irresistible target 
for Dewey”.12 In order to understand how and why the 
structure of Lotze’s logical and epistemological system 
made him an irresistible target for Dewey, however, it is 
first necessary to take a closer look at the new, instrumen-
tal logic that Dewey’s encounter with James led him to 
develop. 
 
 
3. Dewey’s framework: Epistemological vs instrumen-
tal logic 
 
Dewey’s approach to Lotze in Studies in Logical Theory 
is informed by the idea that there are two radically diffe-
rent and mutually exclusive ways of thinking about logic. 
On the one hand there is “the epistemological logician” 
whose thinking leads to an “epistemological type of lo-
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gic” (p. 55)13. This type of logic is then opposed to the 
“instrumental type” (p. 53) of logic that Dewey himself 
espouses. As Dewey sees it, the difference between these 
two forms of logic has to do both with the way they think 
about thinking as well as with what they take to be the 
fundamental problem of logic. According to Dewey, the 
characteristic thing about “the epistemological logician” 
is thus that he does not just operate with a distinction be-
tween “thought as such” or “at large” and “reality as 
such” or “at large” (pp. 50, 51), but also thinks that “the 
main problem” of logic is to decide whether “the specifi-
cations of thought as such hold good of reality as such” 
(p. 51). So the epistemological logician presupposes a 
sharp separation between thought and reality (or the su-
bjective and the objective), which he then thinks it is the 
primary job of logic to try to bridge, and it is because he 
thinks that “logic is supposed to grow out of” this classi-
cal epistemological problem “and lead up to its solution” 
(p. 51) that Dewey calls this type of logician “epistemo-
logical”.  
As Dewey sees it, the history of philosophy has been 
dominated by two (warring) types of epistemological lo-
gics, namely, “empiristic” and “transcendental logics” (p. 
85). The difference between these two forms of epistemo-
logical logic has to do with the way in which they try to 
bridge the gulf between “thought as such” and “reality as 
such” in order to explain how “the specifications of 
thought as such” can “hold good of reality as such”. 
The characteristic thing about empiristic logics, as 
Dewey understands them, is that they recognize that thin-
king is dependent upon certain, empirical “antecedents” 
(p. 72) in the form of “an experience which is mere exi-
stence or occurrence” (p. 79). Typically this has taken the 
form of an isolated sensory impression or feeling. The job 
of the empiristic logician has then been to find out how it 
is possible to go from this idea of thought as dependent 
upon empirical antecedents to the idea that some ways of 
thinking are of more “worth” (p. 79) than others, even 
though they all take their cue from empirical antecedents. 
The perennial problem for this type of logic, as Dewey 
sees it, is that it becomes virtually impossible to explain 
how it is possible for thought to make a distinction be-
tween valid and invalid ways of thinking if all thinking 
takes its cue from an antecedent that, as “an experience 
which is mere existence or occurrence”, has nothing to do 
with validity and invalidity. The gap between genesis and 
validity simply becomes too wide to bridge. 
As opposed to empiristic logics, transcendental logi-
cians begin from the perspective of thought with the idea 
of “thought as active in forms of its own, pure in and of 
themselves” (p. 85), which then leaves the problem of e-
xplaining why we have reason to think that the forms of 
pure thought are valid for something beyond thought i-
tself, i.e., reality. The way the transcendental logician sol-
ves this problem is by introducing the idea of “some con-
stitutive thought” or “absolute universal thought” (p. 82) 
which has somehow already structured reality rationally, 
so that the categories of pure thought are valid for some-
thing beyond pure thought itself. In the case of human 
beings, however, “Absolute Reason” works “under limi-
ting conditions of finitude of a sensitive and temporal or-
ganism” (p. 82) so that human thinking (which is reflecti-
ve as opposed to constitutive) has to take its cue from 
“fragmentary sensations, impressions, feelings” even 
though reality in itself is rationally structured according to 
the categories of “Absolute Reason” or “Pure Thought” 
(p. 82). Despite the different starting points, however, the 
problem for the transcendental logician is, as Dewey sees 
it, at bottom the same as for the empiristic one (if one i-
gnores the additional problem of explaining why “a per-
fect, absolute, complete, finished thought finds it neces-
sary to submit to alien, disturbing, and corrupting condi-
tions in order, in the end, to recover through reflective 
thought in a partial, piecemeal, wholly inadequate way 
what it possessed at the outset in a much more satisfac-
tory way” (p. 83)). If human thinking, as a consequence 
of human finitude, is reflective and takes its cue from so-
me “wholly indeterminate unrationalized, independent, 
prior existence” (p. 83), then the antecedents of human 
thinking are not really already rationally structured by 
constitutive thought and the transcendental logician has 
the same problem as the empiricist, namely, to explain 
how it is possible to distinguish between valid and invalid 
thinking if reflective human thinking takes its cue from “a 
wholly indeterminate, unrationalized, independent, prior 
existence” (p. 83) 
In order to avoid the problem that he takes to be 
common to both the transcendental and the empiristic 
form of epistemological logic, Dewey’s own instrumental 
approach to logic does not begin with a “fixed distin-
ction” or a “fixed gulf” between “thought as such” and 
“reality as such”. Instead it takes its cue from Dewey’s 
idea of an experience or a situation. According to this ide-
a, there are many different types of experiences or situa-
tions. While some experiences or situations are primarily 
of “an affectional quality”, others are thus “practical or 
appreciative or reflective” (p. 59), as Dewey explains. At 
the same time that Dewey’s thinking about logic takes its 
cue from this idea of an experience or a situation instead 
of the distinction between “thought as such” and “reality 
as such”, it also has a very different take on “the problem 
of logical theory” (p. 52). Instead of thinking that the 
main problem of logical theory is to find out whether “the 
specifications of thought as such hold good of reality as 
such”, an instrumental logician like Dewey believes that 
the main job of logic is, on the one hand, to describe how 
“the reflective process” (p. 65), “activity” (p. 54), “fun-
ction” (p. 65), “situation” (p. ) or “experience” relates to 
“unreflective” (p. 49) forms of experience. Besides de-
scribing how “reflective” experience relates to “unreflec-
tive” experience, however, Dewey also thinks that logic 
should describe the main characteristics of reflective e-
xperience as a peculiar form of experience. So, as Dewey 
sees it, logic should both describe the relations “between” 
reflective and unreflective experience as well as reflective 
experience from “within” (p. 59). 
In order to understand why this way of thinking makes 
Dewey’s approach to logic specifically instrumental, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at his understanding of the 
relation between “reflective” and “unreflective” experien-
ce. According to Dewey, “reflective experience” does not 
just come “out of” (p. 47) an “unreflective” (p. 49) form 
of experience, but also exists “for the sake of” (p. 47) 
such a form of experience. To be more precise, Dewey is 
convinced that the peculiar form of experience termed 
thinking arises as a consequence of tensions, crisis, con-
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flict, disequilibration, disintegration or problems in unre-
flective experience and has as its primary goal to solve 
the problem out of which it arose in the first place. A 
simple example may serve to illustrate Dewey’s thought 
here. Imagine a long jumper who systematically oversteps 
the foul line. Since the purpose of this unreflective form 
of experience or activity is to jump as far as possible wi-
thout overstepping, the fact that he systematically over-
steps creates a tension, conflict, problem or disequilibra-
tion in his activity. This problem may then set the long 
jumper and his coach thinking about why he oversteps. 
Perhaps he thinks too much about the foul line? Perhaps 
his run-up is too long and he gets tired before he reaches 
the foul-line and so on. Whatever conclusion the reflecti-
ve experience leads to, however, the long jumper and the 
coach will use it to modify the jumper’s activity, hoping 
thereby to solve the problem in unreflective experience 
out of which reflection arose in the first place, and it is in 
this sense that Dewey thinks reflective experience or logic 
is to be seen as “an instrument of adjustment or adapta-
tion to a particular environing situation” (p. 58).  
Dewey’s instrumental understanding of the relation 
between reflective and unreflective experience has a 
number of consequences which sets it off from epistemo-
logical logics. First of all Dewey’s approach does not 
imply that the unreflective experience which antecedes 
and evokes reflection is a-rational or meaningless – a me-
re existence or occurrence. Even though the long jumper 
experiences a tension or problem in his activity, it is not 
as if the situation is totally void of meaning. Many things 
still make sense and it is from these that his reflective e-
xperience takes its cue. Secondly, and most importantly, 
Dewey’s approach does not begin by taking “the distin-
ctions of thought and fact, etc., as ontological, as inhe-
rently fixed in the makeup of the structure of being” (p. 
57) in the way that epistemological logics do. Instead, 
Dewey’s instrumental approach sees the “distinction of 
meaning and fact” as “an induced and intentional practi-
cal division of labor” within reflective experience. What 
this means is that the distinction between thought (idea, 
meaning) and fact (reality) is one that is deliberately in-
troduced by the one engaged in a reflective activity be-
cause it is useful if reflective activity is to achieve its goal 
and solve the problem in unreflective experience that e-
voked it in the first place. In the case of the long jumper, 
for example, it will be useful for him in his reflections on 
why he oversteps to introduce a distinction between the 
facts of the case (how long is his run up? What is he thin-
king when he runs etc.) and his ideas about how to chan-
ge his run up or his thoughts while running. But while this 
distinction is important in the jumper’s reflective expe-
rience, it does not, according to Dewey, exist when he is 
unreflectively engaged in jumping, and the only justifica-
tion for introducing it, as well as particular facts and ideas 
in his reflective experience, is because he has reason to 
think that they will help him solve the problem that origi-
nally made him think. For, as Dewey sees it, the test of 
the particular distinctions and objects within reflective 
experience is also instrumental in the sense that “the test 
of validity of [an] idea [or a fact] is its functional or in-
strumental use in effecting the transition from a relatively 
conflicting experience to a relatively integrated one”(p. 
107). And it is because Dewey’s instrumental approach to 
logic in this way does not just treat reflective experience 
as instrumental in relation to a meaningful but problema-
tic and unreflective form of experience, but also treats the 
different distinctions within reflective experience as “fle-
xible and historic, relative and methodological […] inste-
ad of as “absolute, fixed and predetermined”, that he takes 
his own approach to be superior to all epistemological lo-
gics - whether transcendental or empiristic. 
 
 
4. Lotze’s logic as a halting stage in the evolution of 
logical theory 
 
At the most general level, Dewey’s reasons for classifying 
Lotze’s thinking about logic as “a halting stage in the 
evolution of logical theory” is quite clear. On the one 
hand he sees Lotze as trying to break with a transcenden-
tal way of thinking about logic. As he points out in one 
place, the peculiar thing about Lotze’s thinking is thus 
that “he saw that previous transcendental logicians had 
left untouched the specific question of our supposedly fi-
nite, reflective thought to its own antecedents, and he set 
out to make good the defect” (p. 83). In another place he 
makes the same point by remarking that Lotze “is too far 
along to be contented with the reiteration of the purely 
formal distinctions of a merely formal thought-by-itself. 
He recognizes that thought as formal is the form of some 
matter, and has its worth only as organizing that matter to 
meet the ideal demands of reason; and that “Reason” is in 
truth only an adequate systematization of the matter or 
content” (p. 98). So Lotze tried to move away from a 
transcendental approach to logic by taking into account 
the empirical antecedents of thought, and Dewey praises 
many of the insights that this led him to. At the same 
time, however, that Lotze tried to take the empirical ante-
cedents of thinking into account, Dewey also believes that 
this move plunged him into fundamental “inconsisten-
cies” (p. 79) and “contradictions” (p. 81) because he ne-
ver freed himself from the dualism between thought in 
itself and reality in itself that Dewey takes to be shared by 
all epistemological logics – transcendental as well as em-
piristic. As Dewey sums up his general view at the end of 
one chapter, “The significance of Lotze for critical purpo-
ses” is thus that “his peculiar effort to combine a tran-
scendental view of thought (i.e. of Thought as active in 
forms of its own, pure in and of themselves) with certain 
obvious facts of the dependence of our thought upon spe-
cific empirical antecedents brings to light fundamental 
defects in both the empiristic and the transcendental lo-
gics. We discover a common failure in both: the failure to 
view logical terms and distinctions with respect to their 
necessary function in the redintegration of experience” (p. 
85). So the reason why Lotze’s logic is so interesting to 
Dewey is because he has tried to move beyond the tradi-
tional empiristic and transcendental logics just as Dewey 
himself wanted to. The big problem, however, is that Lo-
tze did it in the wrong way by sticking to certain “logical 
terms and distinctions” as fixed in themselves instead of 
viewing them instrumentally “with respect to their neces-
sary function in the reintegration of experience”, as De-
wey’s instrumental approach to logic does, and it is be-
cause Lotze’s thinking about logic has not left this com-
mon presupposition of epistemological theory behind that 
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Dewey is led to think that it “represents a halting-stage in 
the evolution of logical theory”. 
In the rest of this paper I will take a closer look at the 
interpretation of Lotze that Dewey takes to support this 
general conclusion. My main purpose here will be to ma-
ke Dewey’s reasons for claiming that Lotze’s thinking 
about logic is characterized by fundamental “inconsisten-
cies” and “contradictions” as clear as possible. Whether 
these reasons are well-founded and Dewey’s various in-
terpretations represent Lotze’s thinking faithfully, I will 
leave to Lotze scholars to determine14. Following his own 
instrumental understanding of the relation between reflec-
tive and unreflective experience, Dewey’s critical 
engagement with Lotze’s thinking is divided into three 
parts. First Dewey analyzes Lotze’s thinking about the 
way in which “reflective experience” is evoked or called 
forth by empirical antecedents. This is done in a chapter 
entitled “The Antecedents and Stimuli of Thinking”. Then 
Dewey engages with Lotze’s understanding of the way in 
which reflective experience is supplied with facts and i-
deas. This is done in the chapter entitled “Data and Mea-
nings”. Finally, Dewey also analyzes Lotze’s understan-
ding of validity or objectivity in a final chapter on “The 
Objects of Thought”. Given the limited amount of space 
available, my main focus in the rest of this paper will be 
on Dewey’s reason for thinking that Lotze’s understan-
ding of “The Antecedents and Stimuli of Thinking” is 
marked by “inconsistencies” and “contradictions”. 
As Dewey presents it, Lotze thinks that the “ultimate 
material antecedents of thought are found in impressions 
which are due to external objects as stimuli” (p. 68). The-
se impressions, as Lotze sees it, are “mere psychical states 
or events” that succeed each other and give rise to a “train 
or current of ideas” (p. 68). This current of ideas, as Lotze 
understands it, is “just as necessary as any succession of 
material events” (pp. 68-9). No matter whether the current 
is the product of successive impressions from external o-
bjects or the product of a single external impression 
which then stimulates an “associative mechanism” (p. 68) 
in such a way that we start remembering or imagining, the 
current of ideas is thus necessary. In order to back up this 
analysis, Dewey refers to some of the opening pages of 
Lotze’s Logic and provides the following quotation from 
Lotze: “Just because, under their respective conditions, 
every such series of ideas hangs together by the same ne-
cessity and law as every other, there would be no ground 
for making any such distinction of value as that between 
truth and untruth, thus placing one group in opposition to 
all the others” (p. 69, Lotze I, p. 2). As this passage indi-
cates, no distinctions of value (of truth and untruth) exist 
within the series of ideas as such. One person may be led 
to think that the position of the stars is the reason why he 
lost his job when he in fact lost it after his horoscope had 
predicted it, while another person’s reading of Marx may 
lead him to think that he lost his job because of capita-
lism’s inherent tendency to move production to where the 
production costs are lowest. As mere currents of ideas, 
they will be on the same level. They will each have been 
produced by the same necessity determined by external 
impressions and the associative mechanism. According to 
Lotze, however, the current of ideas happens to have “a 
peculiar property” since some ideas “are merely coherent” 
while others are “coherent” in the sense that they reflect a 
“real connection” among things or events (p. 69), and it is 
the special job of thought to “recover and confirm the co-
herent, the really connected” at the same time that it “eli-
minates the coincident as such” (p. 69). According to 
Dewey, these are the main features of Lotze’s thinking 
about the empirical antecedents of thought. On the one 
hand there is “de facto coexistences and sequences” in the 
form or “mere happenings” and then there is the activity 
of thought which tries to assess “the cognitive worth of 
these combinations” (p. 69). 
Dewey’s assessment of Lotze’s thinking about the an-
tecedents of thought reflects his overall assessment of Lo-
tze’s thinking. On the one hand he thus praises the fact 
that Lotze does not just avoid “the extravagancies of tran-
scendental logic, which assumes that all the matter of e-
xperience is determined from the very start by rational 
thought”, but also “avoids the pitfall of purely empirical 
logic which make no distinction between the mere occur-
rence and association of ideas and the real worth and va-
lidity of the various conjunctions thus produced” (p. 70). 
On the other hand, however, Dewey also thinks that “a 
further analysis” of Lotze’s position will lead to the con-
clusion that it is riddled through and through with incon-
sistencies and self-contradictions” (p. 70). 
The big problem, as Dewey sees it, has to do with the 
fact that Lotze is led to provide “impressions and ideas” 
with two radically different and irreconcilable roles. His 
basic position is that the impressions are “the ultimate an-
tecedent in its purest and crudest form” in the sense that it 
is “that which has never felt, for good or bad, the influen-
ce of thought” (p. 70). This is the idea that impressions 
are “nothing but states of consciousness, moods of our-
selves, bare psychical existences” (p 71). At the same 
time, however, that Lotze takes an impression to be “a 
bare event” that antecedes thinking but has never expe-
rienced “the influence of thought”, Dewey also believes 
that he takes impressions to furnish “the material content 
of thinking”. In order to back up this claim, Dewey quotes 
copiously from Lotze, who says such things as “it is the 
relations themselves already subsisting between impres-
sions, when we become conscious of them, by which the 
action of thought which is never anything but reaction, is 
attracted; and this action consists merely in interpreting 
relations which we find existing between our passive im-
pressions into aspects of the matter of impressions” (De-
wey p. 70, Lotze I, p. 25); “thought can make no differen-
ce where it finds none already in the matter of the impres-
sions” (Dewey p. 70, Lotze I, p. 36) and “the possibility 
and the success of thought’s procedure depends upon this 
original constitution and organization of the whole world 
of ideas, a constitution which, though not necessary in 
thought, is all the more necessary to make thinking possi-
ble” (p. Dewey p. 71, Lotze I, p. 36). 
The reason why Dewey finds it so problematic that 
Lotze lets impressions and ideas play, first, the role of 
“ultimate antecedents” or “crude material” and, then, the 
role of “content for thought” (p. 71) is that he takes it to 
amount to a contradiction. As he sees it, it simply does 
not make sense to say, first, that an impression “is merely 
subjective”, “a bare state of our own consciousness” or a 
“mere happening” and then go on to say that it is in fact 
determined not only by “external objects as stimuli” but 
also by an associative mechanism “so thoroughly objecti-
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ve or regular in its workings as to give the same necessary 
character to the current of ideas as possessed by any 
physical sequence” (p. 71). For when Lotze treats the im-
pressions as determined in this way, they are no longer 
treated as “bare psychical existences” but as “real facts in 
a real world” with the (unexplained) “capacity of repre-
senting the cosmic facts which cause them” (p. 71). Ac-
cording to Dewey, this contradiction in Lotze’s thinking 
is a direct product of the fact that he attempts to “put 
thought’s work, as concerned with objective validity, over 
against experience as a mere antecedent happening, or 
occurrence” at the same time that he also wants to “consi-
der thought as an independent somewhat in general which 
nevertheless, in our experience, is dependent upon a raw 
material of mere impressions given to it” (p. 80). So Lo-
tze wants to move away from a purely transcendental lo-
gic by taking the empirical antecedents of thinking into 
account. But because he is stuck with an empiristic con-
ception of experience as “mere impressions”, the only 
way in which he can take the empirical antecedents into 
account if he also wants to keep a distinction between va-
lid and invalid ways of thinking is by describing his “im-
pressions” in contradictory terms. 
So, according to Dewey, Lotze’s thinking about the 
antecedents of thought represents “a halting stage in the 
evolution of logical theory” because it never frees itself 
from the idea that Dewey takes to plague all epistemolo-
gical logics: that “the difference between the logical and 
its antecedent is a matter of the difference between worth 
and mere existence or occurrence” (p. 79). And the only 
way, Dewey thinks, that someone like Lotze can avoid the 
contradictions that such a distinction leads to is by drop-
ping the distinction and turning towards Dewey’s own 
(instrumental) conception of logic, according to which 
“meaning and value is already there” in the unreflective 
experience that evokes thought, which then has for its 
task “the transformation or reconstruction of meaning, 
through an intermediary position” (p. 72). It is because 
Lotze, despite his good intentions and many specific in-
sights, never managed to do this, that Dewey took his 
thinking about logic to represent “a halting stage in the 
evolution of logical theory”.  
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